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Risky Killing and the Ethics of War*Seth Lazar
Killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers. Although this principle is widely
affirmed, recent military practice and contemporary just war theory have under-
mined it. This article argues that killing an innocent person is worse the likelier
it was, when you acted, that he would be innocent: riskier killings are worse than
less risky killings. In war, killing innocent civilians is almost always riskier than
killing innocent soldiers. So killing innocent civilians is worse than killing inno-
cent soldiers. Since almost all civilians are innocent in war, and since killing
innocent civilians is worse than killing liable soldiers, killing civilians is worse
than killing soldiers.
I. INTRODUCTIONKilling civilians is worse than killing soldiers. If any moral principle com-
mands near universal assent, this one does. It is written into every major
historical and religious tradition that has addressed armed conflict. It is
uncompromisingly inscribed in international law. It underpins and in-
forms public discussion of conflict—we always ask first how many civilians* I wrote this article with the support of an Australian Research Council DECRA award.
I presented its ancestors at departmental colloquia at Adelaide, ANU, Leeds, Rutgers, USC,
and Warwick. Many thanks to the convenors of those seminars for inviting me to visit, and to
the audiences for all their comments. For particularly helpful suggestions and discussion,
thanks to Christian Barry, Geoffrey Brennan, Rachael Briggs, Timothy Campbell, Garrett
Cullity, Antony Eagle, Kenny Easwaran, David Enoch, Cécile Fabre, Helen Frowe, Anne
Gelling, Adil Haque, Niko Kolodny, Gerald Lang, Lisa Miracchi, Mike Otsuka, Philip Pettit,
Jon Quong, Henry Shue, Nic Southwood, Matt Smith, Victor Tadros, Larry Temkin, Pekka
Varynen, Gerard Vong, and David Wiens. My thoughts on both probability and on writing
philosophy have been immeasurably advanced by chatting with Alan Hájek. Thanks to Jeff
McMahan both for substantive discussion and for making me think again about style. And
thank you to the reviewers, editor, managing editor, and associate editors of this Journal, who
together helped make this article the best it could be.
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died? And it guides political practice, at least in liberal democracies, both
in how we fight our wars and in which wars we fight.1
92 Ethics October 2015Everyone agrees that killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers.
Everyone, that is, except contemporary just war theorists. Back in the
1970s, Michael Walzer defended this principle with a simple argument.2
Civilians and soldiers all start with rights to life. But soldiers pose lethal
threats, so they lose that right. Killing civilians violates their rights; kill-
ing soldiers does not: simple, even elegant. But in recent years philoso-
phers have exposed the flawed premises behind this welcome conclusion.
Walzer had his facts wrong: many soldiers contribute no more to threats
thandomany civilians.Worse, his account of how one loses the right to life
is mistaken.3 Posing a threat is neither necessary nor sufficient for one to
become liable to be killed.
However, as compelling as the critique of Walzer has been, his critics
have proved too much. Their theories cannot explain why killing civil-
ians is worse than killing soldiers. According to their revisionist view, one
loses the right to life by being responsible for contributing to unjustified
threats.4 Yet first, many soldiers and civilians are equally responsible for1. Hinduism:WendyDoniger,TheLaws ofManu ðLondon:Penguin,1991Þ, 137–38, verses
91–93; Islam: Muhammad Munir, “The Protection of Civilians in War: Non-combatant
Immunity in Islamic Law War,”Hamdard Islamicus 34 ð2011Þ, online at http://works.bepress.
com/muhammad_munir/13; Judaism: Daniel Reisel, “The Halachic Duty to Avoid Civilian
Casualties,” The Jewish Chronicle Online, at http://www.thejc.com/judaism/judaism-features
/the-halachic-duty-avoid-civilian-casualties; Christianity and the broader Western tradition:
Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrik Syse, and Endre Begby, The Ethics of War: Classic and Contempo-
rary Readings ðOxford: Blackwell, 2006Þ, 131 ðRaymond of PeñafortÞ, 222 ðChristine de PisanÞ,
248 ðCajetanÞ, 324 ðVitoriaÞ, 362 ðSuarezÞ, 432 ðGrotiusÞ, 474 ðChristan von WolffÞ. For a
general history, see Colm Mckeogh, Innocent Civilians: The Morality of Killing in War ðBasing-
stoke: Palgrave, 2002Þ. For the laws of war, see especially Articles 48, 51, and 57 of the first
additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions. On public discussion of civilian casualties,
see, e.g., Anthony Reuben, “Caution Needed with Gaza Casualty Figures,” BBC News Online
ð2014Þ, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28688179; the Iraq Body Count,
which collects statistics primarily about civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003 www.iraqbodycount
.org; and the International Committee of the Red Cross, www.icrc.org/en/what-we-do/protecting
-civilians. And on contemporary military practice, see Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the
Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq,” International Security
32 ð2007Þ: 7–46. Recent ðLibyaÞ and ongoing ðSyria/Northern IraqÞ interventions in the Mid-
dle East have been provoked by anticivilian violence.
2. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations
ðNew York: Basic, 1977Þ.
3. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, Killing in War ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2009Þ;
Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995Þ;
Tony Coady, Morality and Political Violence ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008Þ;
David Rodin, War and Self-Defense ðOxford: Clarendon, 2002Þ.
4. See, e.g., McMahan, “Innocence, Self-Defense and Killing inWar,” Journal of Political
Philosophy 2 ð1994Þ: 193–221; McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114 ð2004Þ:
This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
such contributions; indeed, many from both groups are not responsible
at all.5 Second, this principle does not distinguish between killing civil-
Lazar Risky Killing 93ians and soldiers on the just side ðif there is oneÞ.6 This is a big departure
from the common sense consensus. Consider the conflict in Syria and
Northern Iraq, raging as I write. When ISIS fighters kill Peshmerga sol-
diers, they surely commit grievous wrongs. But it’s even worse when they
kill civilians, like the Yazidi whose suffering triggered international in-
tervention. Even if all the killing one does in war is wrong, still, killing
civilians is worse than killing soldiers.
In this article, I want to vindicate common sense. The first step is to
be more precise. I will defend this principle:
Moral Distinction: In war, with rare exceptions, killing enemy non-
combatants is pro tanto more seriously fact-relative wrongful than
5
Upho
742; r
6
War, 7
7
Distin
comb
again
S
comb
Subst
519–7
Frowekilling enemy combatants.
Some clarifications: first, ‘civilians’ and ‘soldiers’ are more eupho-
nious, but the fundamental categories here are noncombatants and com-
batants. I will use these pairs of terms interchangeably, but I endorse the
definition of noncombatant and combatant status given in international
law. Combatants are members of the armed forces of a group at war and
nonmembers who directly participate in hostilities. Noncombatants are
not combatants.
Second, I named the principle for the Moral Distinction between
harms inflicted on civilians and soldiers in war. It is inspired by, but dif-
fers from, the principle of distinction in the laws of armed conflict, which
prohibits targeting civilians.7 Moral Distinctionmakes a comparative claim
rather than specifying a prohibition, and it covers all kinds of killing,
whether intentional, incidental, or accidental. In practice, the protection
of civilians in war depends on the principle of distinction, as well as on
693–732; Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2012Þ; Helen. McMahan, “Innocence”: 210; Noam J. Zohar, “Innocence and Complex Threats:
lding the War Ethic and the Condemnation of Terrorism,” Ethics 114 ð2004Þ: 734–51,
eference omitted.
. McMahan, “Killing in War”: 718; McMahan, Killing in War, 16; Fabre, Cosmopolitan
2–75.
. This is the International Committee of the Red Cross’s statement of the Principle of
ction: “The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and
atants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed
st civilians.”
ome legal scholars divide this into two components: to distinguish, and to attack only
atants. See Adil Ahmad Haque, “Protecting and Respecting Civilians: Correcting the
antive and Structural Defects of the Rome Statute,”New Criminal LawReview 14 ð2011Þ:
5.
, Defensive Killing ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Þ.
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other norms of international law, such as proportionality and precautions
in attack ðas in articles 51 and 57 of the first additional protocol to the
94 Ethics October 2015Geneva conventionsÞ. But each of these norms presupposes Moral Dis-
tinction ðor something close to itÞ, since if killing civilians were no worse
than killing soldiers, then we should either extend these protections to
soldiers or strip them from civilians. The first outlaws war altogether; the
second leaves it practically unconstrained.Of course, defending these legal
principles requiresmorebesidesMoralDistinction.Butwithout aprinciple
like Moral Distinction, that project is hopeless.
Third, I introduce each term in the relation “X is pro tanto more
seriously fact-relativewrongful thanY ” in Section II. Inbrief, itmeans that
holding constant the numbers affected, the degree of harm, and the aim
sought, the objective moral reasons against X are weightier than those
against Y. When I write “X is worse than Y,” this is what I mean. Note that
this is consistent with Y not being wrongful at all.
Fourth, Moral Distinction distinguishes between different acts of
killing by the same agent. It does not offer a general weighting of the
lives of combatants and noncombatants but a specific account of the
comparative wrongfulness of killing these two types of person. Since we do
not ðexcept accidentallyÞ kill people on our side, it therefore differenti-
ates between killing enemy noncombatants and killing enemy combatants.
The best defense of Moral Distinction will invoke multiple overlap-
ping foundations. Although each will have exceptions, taken together
they will robustly protect civilians in war. In this article, I introduce one
strand of that pluralist defense, which complements Walzer’s and the re-
visionists’ arguments, but remedies their defects. In particular, it is com-
patible with many civilians and soldiers being equally ðnonÞresponsible
for unjustified threats; and it applies to both the just and the unjust
sides. I first argue that killing an innocent person is worse, the more
likely it was that he would be innocent: riskier killings are, other things
equal, worse than less risky killings. I then argue that in war, with rare
exceptions, killing civilians is riskier than killing soldiers. So I conclude
ðwith a few more steps along the way, and again with rare exceptionsÞ
that killing civilians is worse than killing soldiers.
However, perhaps this whole approach is misguided: maybe instead
of seeking the roots of Moral Distinction, we should know it by its fruits.8
Perhaps our commitment to this principle reduces the suffering that
war inevitably involves, and no further justification is needed. This might
be right; it is certainly politic: we can more easily inspire adherence to
8. George I. Mavrodes, “Conventions and the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs 4 ð1975Þ: 117–31; Janina Dill and Henry Shue, “Limiting the Killing in War: Military
Necessity and the St. Petersburg Assumption,” Ethics and International Affairs 26 ð2012Þ:
311–33.
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a norm if everyone thinks it in their interests. But we should hesitate
before relying on instrumental reasons to protect civilians in war. They
Lazar Risky Killing 95are least effective when civilians are most vulnerable—when belligerents
believe that harming civilians does minimize suffering, because it is nec-
essary to achieve their aims.9 This is when civilians need Moral Distinc-
tion most, but instrumental arguments protect them least.
Even if the instrumental argument succeeded, it would vindicate
Moral Distinction for the wrong reasons. The outrage we feel when villages
are burned, hospitals gutted, and schools bombed is not pragmatically
motivated. Formany of us, our commitment to the protection of civilians in
war is more visceral than instrumental arguments alone can capture. We
should mobilize all the resources of moral philosophy in its defense.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Like both Walzer and his critics, I think everything starts with rights.
Persons have a right to life, which protects their interest in living.10
Sometimes that protection can be weakened or lost. In particular, when
killing a person is a necessary and proportionate means to avert an un-
justified threat, for which she is responsible enough, then she is liable to be
killed, and killing her does not infringe her right to life: killing her does
not wrong her at all. Killing her is proportionate if the threat averted is
serious enough tomakeher liable to be killed to avert it. It is necessary if no
other less harmful means could avert the threat.11 When someone is not
liable to be killed, I will call her innocent.
When an act is wrong tout court it is morally impermissible. When it is
pro tanto wrongful, a moral reason tells against it; it would be wrong tout
court were no other moral reasons at stake. Normally acts are wrongful be-
cause they wrong someone. An act can be overall permissible despite be-
ing pro tanto wrongful, if weighty reasons in favor override the reasons
against.
9. For chilling historical research to support this point, see Benjamin A. Valentino,
Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century ðIthaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2004Þ. For more recent examples, see the public justifications offered for the appar-
ently disproportionate harms inflicted on Gazan civilians in the 2014 Gaza War, which ap-
pealed to their military necessity: Herb Keinon, “PM: Terrorists Watching Whether World
Gives Immunity for Attacks from Schools, Homes,”Jerusalem Post, August 6, 2014 ð2014Þ, at
http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/WATCH-LIVE-Netanyahu-addresses
-foreign-press-in-aftermath-of-Gaza-operation-370255; Yishai Schwartz, “Israel’s Deadly In-
vasion of Gaza Is Morally Justified,” New Republic, July 21, 2014 ð2014Þ, at http://www.new
republic.com/article/118788/israels-war-gaza-morally-justified.
10. What makes an entity qualify for personhood is a vexed issue, which I do not
address here.
11. This is a simplification; for more detail, see Seth Lazar, “Necessity in Self-Defense
and War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 ð2012Þ: 3–44.
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Killing the innocent is pro tanto wrongful. Even when it is overall
permissible, the victim has a justified complaint against the agent who in-
96 Ethics October 2015fringed her rights. Killings can be, pro tanto, more or less gravely wrongful:
consider the difference between murder and manslaughter, for example.
Killing is generally pro tanto more wrongful than other kinds of harm. For
pro tanto seriously wrongful acts to be permissible, the overriding reasons
must be proportionately weighty. Since I focus throughout this article on
pro tanto wrongfulness, I will omit ‘pro tanto’ except for emphasis.
An act can be wrongful in at least three senses.12 An act is fact-relative
wrongful if it is wrongful in light of all the facts.13 It is evidence-relative wrong-
ful if it is wrongful in light of the agent’s evidence. And it is belief-relative
wrongful if it is wrongful in light of the agent’s beliefs. I focus throughout
on fact-relative wrongfulness, so I omit ‘fact-relative’ except for emphasis.
Sincemy topic is risk, we also need a working understanding of prob-
ability. There are three prominent conceptions. Objective probabilities—
chances—are mind- and perspective-independent features of the world,
like the 50 :50 chance that a radium atom will decay within 1600 years.
Evidential probability is the probability justified by a body of evidence.On
the most plausible accounts, evidence gives an intuitive, though impre-
cise, degree of support to the hypothesis in question.14 Subjective prob-
ability is the probability assigned by a subject.15 Evidential and subjective
probabilities are both species of epistemic probability, indexed to a par-
ticular epistemic position.
With these pieces in place, I can state my normative thesis more pre-
cisely: when A kills B, and B is not liable to be killed, other things equal
A’s act is pro tanto more seriously fact-relative wrongful the higher the ep-
istemic probability,16 when she acted, that B was not liable to be killed.
Riskier killings are worse than less risky killings.17 Call this thesis Risky Killing.
12. This terminology was introduced by Derek Parfit, On What Matters ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 150–74. It has been defended as superior to other termi-
nologies by Victor Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law ðOxford:
Oxford University Press, 2011Þ, 217–40. The same tripartite diversion works for permissi-
bility simpliciter.
13. Parfit writes that an act is “wrong in the fact-relative sense just when this act would be
wrong in the ordinary sense if we knew all of the morally relevant facts” ðOn What Matters,
150Þ. However, what matters is not whether we know the facts, but what the facts are.
14. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits ðOxford: Oxford University Press,
2000Þ, 223; Roger White, “Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence,” Oxford Studies in
Epistemology ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2009Þ, 161–86.
15. See, e.g., F. P. Ramsey, “Truth and Probability,” in Philosophy of Probability: Contem-
porary Readings, ed. Antony Eagle ðNew York: Routledge, 2010Þ, 52–94; Bruno De Finetti,
Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment ðChichester: Wiley, 1990Þ.
16. This is intentionally ambiguous between the two kinds of epistemic probability—
more on this in Sec. III.
17. Recall that “X is worse than Y,” for my purposes, simply means “X is pro tantomore
seriously fact-relative wrongful than Y.”
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III. RISKY KILLING
Lazar Risky Killing 97A. Overview
To build a case for Risky Killing, it will help to have some examples in
mind. Consider:
Sniper-Low : Aggie is a sniper, hunting Charlie, a terrorist whose death
will save lives. She has a man in her sights. Her evidential and sub-
proba
get is
1
innoc
2
Philos
Theo
Russe
ð1998
2
Effecjective probability that this is not Charlie are both 0.1. She fires. She
kills Bruce, who was in fact innocent.
Sniper-High: The same as Sniper-Low, except that Aggie’s evidential
and subjective probability that this is not Charlie are high—say, 0.9.18
Aggie’s act is worse in Sniper-High than in Sniper-Low, because it
19was so much likelier that her target was innocent. Many will share this
intuition. Aggie took a bigger risk with Bruce’s life in Sniper-High than
in Sniper-Low, so of course she wronged him more seriously if she kills
him! Indeed, some will find this basic intuition more convincing than
any argument in its favor. However, in this section I offer three arguments
ðIII.B –III.DÞ to persuade those who are not already on board. I then
address what followswhenAggie’s evidence andherbeliefs diverge ðIII.EÞ,
before stating Risky Killing in its canonical form ðIII.F Þ.
B. Disrespect
An agent’s mental states when violating a right can affect the seriousness
of that right-violation.20 Intended rights-violations are worse than unin-
tended ones; killing an innocent person for one’s gratification is worse
than killing him to save others’ lives; killing himopportunistically is worse
than killing him to eliminate a threat that he himself poses.21 In the same
spirit, I think violating someone’s right to life when one believes one’s
act will probably violate that right is worse than doing so when that out-
come is less likely.
18. These cases raise some interesting issues that I lack space to address here. In par-
ticular, I focus on fact- rather than evidence-relative wrongfulness, and discuss only thebility of innocence, rather than also considering the probability that killing her tar-
unnecessary or disproportionate.
9. For simplicity, assume that Aggie is sure that if this is not Charlie, then it is an
ent person.
0. This claim is rejected by, among others, Judith Jarvis Thomson, “Self-Defense,”
ophy and Public Affairs 20 ð1991Þ: 283–310; Frances M. Kamm, “Failures of Just War
ry: Terror, Harm, and Justice,” Ethics 114 ð2004Þ: 650–92. For excellent defenses, see
ll Christopher, “Self-Defense and Defense of Others,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 27
Þ: 123–41; Tadros, The Ends of Harm, 139–66.
1. Warren S. Quinn, “Actions, Intentions, andConsequences: TheDoctrine of Double
t,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 ð1989Þ: 334–51; Tadros, The Ends of Harm.
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To see why, consider a paradigm wrongful killing: Aggie is certain
that Bruce is innocent but intentionally cuts his throat to satisfy a whim.
98 Ethics October 2015By killing Bruce like this, she shows herself ready to violate his most fun-
damental right for a trivial end. This shows total disregard for his stand-
ing as her moral equal, someone with moral status, whom she cannot use
to fulfil her whims. Now vary the likelihood that Bruce is innocent—
suppose there is some probability that killing him will avert a lethal
threat to an innocent victim. The less likely this possibility, themore likely
it is that Bruce is innocent. If Aggie nonetheless proceeds, then she
proves herself proportionately readier to sacrifice him for her own trivial
goals, and she more gravely insults his moral standing.
One might object that Aggie does not disrespect Bruce in the
Sniper cases since, unlike in the paradigm case, her aim is noble: to save
Charlie’s victims.22 Suppose we stipulate that Charlie’s potential victims
are numerous enough that proceeding, at least in Sniper-High, is evi-
dence-relative permissible. How can Aggie disrespect Bruce if she does
what she ought to do given her evidence?
Even if the stakes are high, Aggie disrespects her victim more
gravely in Sniper-High than in Sniper-Low, by proving herself readier to
sacrifice an innocent person for the greater good. Even if one’s act is
all things considered permissible, if it imposes on someone else a cost
that she is not required to bear, one disrespects her by treating her as a
resource to use or sacrifice for others’ sakes.23 This explains why justifying
such impositions is hard, and why marginal trade-offs ðharming one
person for a slightly larger benefit to anotherÞ are wrong. The higher the
probability that her target is innocent, the more seriously Aggie
instrumentalizes him, showing disregard for his moral status as an end
inhimself. This basic principle applies whetherher ends are noble, trivial,
or pernicious.
C. Necessity
The second argument focuses on the choice between harming those who
are more and less likely to be innocent. Consider,
Sniper-Choice : The same as Sniper-Low, except that Aggie can choose
between two targets, each of whom she believes could be Charlie.
2
2
great
Ends
sacrifi
achie
requiThe probability that the first ðcall him Bruce-LowÞ is not Charlie is
2. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this objection.
3. Tadros argues that it is permissible to sacrifice an innocent person’s life for the
er good, when that person would be required to sacrifice his own life for that end ðThe
of Harm, 129Þ. I favor a different view: we have an agent-centered prerogative not to
ce our own lives for others’ sakes. It can therefore be permissible to kill someone to
ve an objective that she would not, because of her agent-centered prerogative, be
red to sacrifice her own life to realize.
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0.1; the probability that the second ðBruce-HighÞ is not Charlie is
0.9. Both Bruce-Low and Bruce-High are in fact innocent.
2
2
Impo
2
ðCam
Lazar Risky Killing 99The necessity constraint on defensive force prohibits inflicting un-
24necessary harm, even on someone who might otherwise be liable. It de-
pends on the truism that all harm is bad ðexcept perhaps when deservedÞ
and so should beminimized. This reasoning extends beyond actual harms,
to risks of harm: if a defensive act involves an unnecessary risk of harm,
then that too counts against it, however the risk turns out. Moreover, this
extendsevenmore forcefully to risksofwrongful harm, sincewrongfulharms
are worse than otherwise similar non-wrongful harms. In other words:
if we should minimize harm, then we should minimize risks of harm; and
if we shouldminimize risks of harm, we shouldminimize risks of wrongful
harm.
Whether Aggie shoots Bruce-High or Bruce-Low, she imposes the
same risk of harm ðshe is a crack shot and certain to hit her targetÞ. But if
she shoots Bruce-High, then the probability that he is innocent is higher,
so she imposes a higher risk of wrongful harm than if she shoots Bruce-
Low. Killing Bruce-High therefore imposes an unnecessary risk of wrong-
ful harm on him. Aggie could have had the same opportunity to kill
Charlie, at a lower risk, by killing Bruce-Low. Killing Bruce-High is there-
fore worse than killing Bruce-Low, because it breaches the necessity con-
straint on defensive force.
D. Endangerment
Rights-violating killings are worse violations of the right to life when they
are riskier. I also think riskier killings more seriously breach a further
right, not to be exposed to unchosen risks of wrongful harm; for short,
the right not to be endangered. The argument has four stages.
Stage 1: Endangerment is wrongful even if the risks imposed do not
lead to harm.25 Speeding through a residential neighborhood or con-
ducting brain surgery while drunk are wrong, even if one avoids a colli-
sion or removes the tumor. And riskier behavior is, other things equal,
worse than less risky. If driving through a suburb at 60 mph is wrong,
doing so at 150 mph is still worse; if operating while tipsy is wrong, do-
ing so while smashed is still more so. A few skeptics aside, most philoso-
phers—and most legal jurisdictions—concur that we have a right not to
be exposed to unchosen risks of wrongful harm.264. See, e.g., Lazar, “Necessity in Self-Defense and War.”
5. See Madeleine Hayenhjelm and Jonathan Wolff, “The Moral Problem of Risk
sitions: A Survey,” European Journal of Philosophy 20 ð2012Þ: 26–51.
6. Skeptics: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986Þ; Kenneth Simons, “When Is Negligent
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Stage 2: Divide an instance of endangerment into time stages. At
T1, Driver recklessly enters a neighborhood at 100 mph, knowing there
100 Ethics October 2015are people around, including two pedestrians, Lucky and Unlucky; at
T2, Driver’s car then hits Unlucky, killing her. Lucky escapes unharmed.
Lucky’s right against endangerment was violated atT1. Lucky andUnlucky
were in the same position at T1. So if Driver violated Lucky’s right not to
be endangered, then he also violated Unlucky’s. At T2 Unlucky suffers a
second right-violation, this time of her right to life.
In general, if one person violates another’s right, then whatever hap-
pens afterward, she has still violated that right. Later eventsmight justify that
violation or restore the status quo ante through compensation. But noth-
ing after a right-violation can make it as though it never happened. Of
course, violating someone’s right to life is worse than violating his right
not to be endangered. When the two occur together, we naturally focus
on the more serious right-violation. This is true, for example, with mur-
der. In no case, however, does a second right-violation erase an earlier
one.
One might worry about how to individuate wrongful impositions of
risk. Suppose Driver is doing laps of a block. Does he violate the pedes-
trians’ rights against endangerment each time he passes them?27 I think
their rights protect the pedestrians against the Driver acting in a cer-
tain way. Whether he violates their right each lap depends on how we
individuate the relevant acts. I cannot properly address such a big topic
here.28 I simply claim that, however we individuate his acts, Driver does
the same thing to Lucky and Unlucky at T1. That he then does something else,
violating another of Unlucky’s rights, does not remove a complaint that
she would have had, had he not violated that second right.
Stage 3: In stages 1 and 2 the agent imposes a risk of harm on some-
one who we know not to be liable. My primary interest, however, is in
risks of suffering wrongful harm, when the harm is certain, but liability is
in doubt. I must show that intuitions about one carry over to the other.
They do. What matters for this argument and indeed those in Sec-
tions III.B and III.C, is that the agent has imposed a risk of wrongful harm.
By showing herself readier to impose that risk in Sniper-High than in
Sniper-Low, Aggie shows greater disrespect for Bruce. By choosing to27. Thanks to a reviewer for raising this objection.
28. Does each punch in an ongoing attack violate one’s rights? I am inclined to think
that it does, so we should not be surprised to see something similar with risk.
Inadvertence Culpable?” Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 ð2011Þ: 97–114. Supporters: John
Oberdiek, “The Moral Significance of Risking,” Legal Theory 18 ð2012Þ: 339–56; Stephen
Perry, “Risk, Harm, Interests, and Rights,” in Risk: Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Tim Lewens
ðNew York: Routledge, 2007Þ, 190–210; Michael J. Zimmerman, “Risk, Rights, and Resti-
tution,” Philosophical Studies 128 ð2006Þ: 285–311.
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fire at Bruce-High rather than Bruce-Low in Sniper-Choice, she runs
an unnecessary risk of inflicting wrongful harm on her victim. And for
Lazar Risky Killing 101endangerment, the same principles apply.
Consider, for example, Jean Charles de Menezes, the Brazilian man
killed by British police in the mistaken belief that he was a terrorist.
Killing this man was egregiously wrongful, in part because it was so likely
when the officers acted that he was innocent. They took a terrible risk
with an innocent man’s rights. But they shot him point-blank in the
head: their act was sure to be lethal. They wrongfully endangered de
Menezes because they attacked him without adequate grounds to believe
him liable.29
Stage 4: The first three stages should persuade anyone who already
thinks we have a right against endangerment that it is relevant to Aggie’s
wrongdoing in Sniper-High. For any remaining skeptics, sketching a the-
ory of that right may help.30
The right against endangerment has roots in our interest in secu-
rity, which is both instrumentally and noninstrumentally valuable. Se-
curity is the avoidance of unchosen risks of wrongful harm. Enjoying
security is instrumental to enjoying other goods.31 If I am secure, then
I escape harms that might otherwise have befallen me. Being insecure
also generates anxiety and distress. Besides upsetting us in the present,
insecurity also makes it more difficult to plan, by closing off options be-
cause of the risks involved.32
For hedonistic and preference-satisfaction theories of well-being,
these instrumental goods exhaust security’s value. For objectivist theo-
ries, there is more to say.
First, I am better off if my freedom from wrongful harm does not
avoidably depend on luck. Luck is antithetical to control: if my avoiding
some outcome depends on luck, then I cannot control whether that out-
come will come about. Control, in turn, is one constituent of autonomy—
being autonomous implies having some control overhowone’s life goes.33
29. There were also many prior instances of gross negligence in this case: see “Seven
Mistakes that Cost De Menezes His Life,” Independent, December 13, 2008, at http://www
.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/seven-mistakes-that-cost-de-menezes-his-life
-1064466.html.
30. I think these are attractive alternatives: Perry, “Risk, Harm, Interests, and Rights”;
Oberdiek, “The Moral Significance of Risking.” For a view with some parallels to my own,
see Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage ðOxford: Oxford University Press,
2007Þ, 63–73.
31. For example, see Hayenhjelm and Wolff, “The Moral Problem of Risk Imposi-
tions.”
32. Oberdiek, “The Moral Significance of Risking”; Stephen John, “Security, Knowl-
edge and Well-Being,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 ð2011Þ: 68–91.
33. This is especially clear on Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom as nondomination but
is also a plausible development of Raz’s account of autonomy. See Pettit, “Freedom and
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Being autonomous is noninstrumentally valuable; most of us aspire to
this ideal for its own sake, not because of other goods it brings us. Since
102 Ethics October 2015having control is a way of being autonomous, having control should be
noninstrumentally valuable too. Moreover, control over whether one suf-
fers wrongful harm is especially important, given how central our interest
in not being wrongfully harmed is. Suppose neither of two people ever
suffers wrongful harm, though for one but not the other this was a matter
of mere luck. The one who had control was better off than the lucky one,
just in virtue of having that control.
Obviously though, we cannot avoid luck in all aspects of our lives.
But being secure reduces exposure only to one kind of luck: unchosen
risks of wrongful harm. Even though luck is inescapable, if others avoidably
make us dependent on it for our avoidance of wrongful harm, they harm
us. Suppose a friend tells you how to walk home at night, in a city that
you don’t know. He could send you through a safe neighborhood or the
same distance through a neighborhood where late night muggings are
common. He chooses to send you through the dangerous neighbor-
hood. Even if you get home unharmed, you’ve still been made worse off
by having been avoidably placed at risk of wrongful harm—whether you
know about it or not. When you find out what he did, you should defi-
nitely have words. Life is fragile enough without people adding to the
risks we face. Of course, sometimes we enjoy exposing ourselves to risk,
like when we skydive, or catch a minibus in Angola, but this does not
undermine our security, because these risks are chosen.
Second, when I am secure, others are robustly disposed not to
wrongfully harmme, across a rangeof possible scenarios. Being theobject
of their concern is noninstrumentally valuable even if those scenarios
never arise. For example, in a just society others protect me against des-
titution and crime. That my fellow citizens care enough about my well-
being to provide such protections is good for me, even if I never need to
call on them. Similarly, a loving family still further protects me, so that
through life’s vicissitudes I can rely on their support—I enjoy this good
even if my life never turns south.34 When a person is secure, she enjoys a
similar status. If others who could harm her if they chose to are robustly34. I draw here on arguments made in Seth Lazar, “A Liberal Defence of ðSomeÞ
Duties to Compatriots,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 ð2010Þ: 246–57. My current inflec-
tion on them is much informed by conversations with Philip Pettit and Nicholas South-
wood, for which I owe thanks. See Pettit, The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attach-
ment, Virtue, and Respect ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Þ; Southwood, “Democracy
as a Modally Demanding Value,” Noûs. Published electronically 15 April 2013. doi:10.1111
/nous.12021.
Probability: A Comment on Goodin and Jackson,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 ð2008Þ:
206–20; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom ðOxford: Clarendon, 1986Þ.
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disposed not to inflict risks of such harm onher, they protect her, which is
valuable even if situations where she might suffer such harm never arise.
Lazar Risky Killing 103To summarize: being secure is instrumental to realizing important
benefits, like freedom from anxiety and the ability to plan; it gives us
more control over an important part of our lives, so is a noninstrumen-
tally valuable constituent of autonomy; and it means that we have a non-
instrumentally valuable status among those who preserve our security.
These are weighty interests, but they ground rights only if they impose
reasonable costs on the duty-bearers. If wehad to avoid imposing any risks
on others, then we could not live a recognizable modern life—we could
not drive or fly, we would have to quarantine ourselves when sick, and
so on.35 Our interest in security does not provide a blanket right against
all risks, and sometimes it can be outweighed. However, permissible
risks are typically slight, in terms of either the degree or the likelihood
of threatened harm. Beyond that fair distribution of risks within a
society, the right against endangerment is stringent.
E. Which Probabilities?
Thus far, I have assumed that Aggie’s beliefs and her evidence align.
However, sometimes her evidence will warrant one view about whether
her victim is liable, but her beliefs won’t follow. Which determines the
seriousness of her wrongdoing?
This question raises some interesting and complex problems. To
keep things simple, I will focus only on what I need to defend Moral
Distinction ði.e., to show that killing civilians is worse than killing sol-
diersÞ.36 This means showing that each of my arguments works with
Aggie’s ðsincere, saneÞ subjective probabilities, but if she believes Bruce
less likely to be liable than her evidence warrants, then that gives further
grounds for complaint against her when she kills him.
The argument from disrespect works only with subjective probabil-
ities: we cannot infer Aggie’s readiness to instrumentalize her victim from
facts of which she was unaware, or connections that she did not draw,
but only from her ðsincere, saneÞ beliefs. The other two arguments work
either with subjective or with evidential probabilities. Insofar as Aggie
disrespects Bruce-High by inflicting on him an unnecessary risk of wrong-
35. See, e.g., James Lenman, “Contractualism and Risk Imposition,” Politics, Philosophy
and Economics 7 ð2008Þ: 99–122; Sven Ove Hansson, “Ethical Criteria of Risk Acceptance,”
Erkenntnis 59 ð2003Þ: 291–309.
36. There are also interesting overlaps between these questions and those to do with
the relationship between belief-relative, evidence-relative, and fact-relative permissibility
ðon which see Parfit, On What Matters, 150–74; Tadros, The Ends of Harm, 241–61Þ. However,
my probabilistic arguments are merely one constituent in a theory of permissibility; the
implications of different theories of probability for normative ethics are independent of
the implications of the different senses of permissibility.
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ful harm, her subjective probabilities are salient. But even if her beliefs
and evidence diverge, she still subjects him to an unnecessary risk of
104 Ethics October 2015wrongful harm since, relative to Aggie’s evidence, she could have taken
a lesser risk by killing Bruce-Low, without reducing her probability
of achieving her goal. As for endangerment, only when others believe they
are imposing risks of wrongful harm do they impugn one’s status as the
object of others’ concern. But it is also bad for me when others subject
me to risks of wrongful harm on their evidence, even if they do not be-
lieve they are imposing such risks.37
Each argument works with the agent’s subjective probabilities. But
what if she believes Bruce less likely to be liable than her evidence war-
rants? To answer this, we must first know what counts as her evidence. I
think ðthough my views on this are unconventionalÞ evidence is available
to an agent if she would have it if she did the morally required research.
The evidential probability is the probability that the agent ought to assign
to an outcome coming about.38 If the stakes are high— for example, if
she is trying to find out if a building is empty before blowing it up—then
the agent morally ought to expend greater efforts to gather evidence
than if the stakes are low—if she is taking a census, for example, then a
knock on the door will suffice.39
To work out the evidential probability of some outcome, we must
first work out what research the agent ought to do. If she believes her
target is more likely to be innocent than her evidence warrants, then
her wrongdoing tracks her actual beliefs: she wrongs him more gravely
than she would have, had her beliefs matched the evidence. If she
believes her target is less likely to be liable than her evidence warrants,
and she did not do the requisite research or she responded inappropriately to it,
then she has acted negligently, and wronged the victim for that reason.
The same arguments support this conclusion as supported Risky
Killing, though to avoid repetition and to save space, I will keep them
short. First, the agent’s negligent act is more disrespectful—her failure
to do research appropriate to the stakes reflects inadequate regard for
the victim. Her negligence also results in her imposing unnecessary
risks, since she could have avoided them by doing proper research.
Lastly, by proceeding negligently she exposes her victim to unchosen
37. We can ask similar questions about whose perspective we should assess these prob-
abilities from. For simplicity, again, I focus on the agent. But the necessity and endangerment
arguments would still be compelling using the victim’s probabilities. Developing this point
would take me too far afield, but I return to it in Sec. IV.C.
38. Pace Michael J. Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of
Ignorance ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008Þ. On this subject, see also Holly
M. Smith, “The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting,” Ethics 125 ð2014Þ:
11–38. This is not a standard understanding of evidential probability.
39. Alexander Guerrero, “Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and
Caution,” Philosophical Studies 86 ð2007Þ: 59–97.
This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
risks of wrongful harm—both the risks that derive from her negligence
and the risks relative to the evidential probability that her act will
Lazar Risky Killing 105wrongfully harm the victim.
F. Risky Killing Restated
I now have the materials I need for my argument for Moral Distinction.
The following normative thesis expands on the formulation at the end of
Section II:
Risky Killing : If A kills two innocent people, B and C, and B was
more likely, on A’s evidence, to be innocent than C was, then ðother
things equalÞ killing B is objectively worse than killing C just in
case: either A believed B more likely to be liable than C, or, if she
did not, that was because of her negligence.
Before turning to war, let me briefly rebut a general objection to this
thesis. Could Bruce’s likelihood of innocence depend on Aggie’s moral
beliefs? If she were an act-consequentialist, for example, who thinks rights
and liability do not exist, then she would think Bruce is equally unlikely
to be liable in both Sniper-High and Sniper-Low. Wemight also deny that
she disrespects Bruce, if she maximizes expected value.40
I reject this approach to moral justification. If the agent’s moral
beliefs affect the fact-relative permissibility of her actions, then she can
weaken morality’s demands by coming to adopt more permissive moral
beliefs. This is an unacceptable kind of subjectivism ðI return to this point
belowÞ.
Moreover, each of my arguments invokes harms that are in fact
wrongful. The agent’s moral beliefs are beside the point. When Aggie
kills Bruce in Sniper-High, she is more disrespectful than in Sniper-Low,
because she reveals herself readier to sacrifice an innocent person for
an end that he is not in fact required to share. She further aggravates
her violation of Bruce-High’s right to life by imposing an unnecessary
risk of in fact wrongful harm on him, whatever her moral beliefs. And
for endangerment: our lives go better if others do not subject us to un-
chosen risks of suffering in factwrongful harms. Although I obviously care
about avoiding harms in general, I do not have a special interest in avoid-
ing risks of harms that someone else mistakenly believes to be wrongful.
IV. WAR
A. Overview
I now argue from Risky Killing to Moral Distinction. This is only one
strand in a pluralist defense of this principle and does not cover all
40. Thanks to a reviewer for this objection.This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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cases. But it improves in two ways on previous accounts: it is consistent
with many combatants and noncombatants being equally ðnonÞrespon-
106 Ethics October 2015sible for unjustified threats; and it applies to all sides in a conflict. More-
over, these improvements come cheap: I need show only that civilians are
more likely to be innocent than soldiers in war, on which I think most
philosophers, and most other people besides, would agree.41
I argue as follows: first, if one knows about two people only that one
is an enemy civilian, the other an enemy soldier, then the former is more
likely to be innocent than the latter. Second, combatants in war should
know whether their victims are civilians or soldiers. If they cannot find
this out through reasonable research, they ought not to use lethal force
at all ðwith some exceptionsÞ. Third, none of their other evidence over-
turns that initial assessment. Together with Risky Killing, this shows
that killing innocent civilians is worse than killing innocent soldiers; to
get to Moral Distinction, we need simply argue that almost all civilians
are innocent in war.
I endorse the conventional definitions of combatant and noncom-
batant status for two reasons. First, because I want to vindicate the com-
monsense consensus described in the introduction, which has been jeop-
ardized by recent just war theory. Second, this definition fits with my
argument: in war, the most informative evidence we have about our vic-
tims’ innocence is whether they are combatants or noncombatants.
B. Noncombatants Are More Likely to Be Innocent than Combatants
Recall that innocence is the opposite of liability. N is liable to be killed
if killing her is a necessary and proportionate means to avert an unjusti-
fied threat T, and if N is sufficiently responsible for T. N ’s responsibility
for T divides into two parts: her causal contribution and her agential
involvement.42 IfN is the unmediated, necessary, and sufficient cause ofT,
then she is more causally responsible than if she contributes indirectly,
in a manner insufficient and unnecessary for the threat to occur. If N
malevolently intends her victim’s death, knowing it unjustified, her
agential involvement is greater than if it was barely foreseeable that her
act would bring about T.
How much responsibility do we need for liability to be killed? Some
think the degree varies with the stakes: if killing can achieve more good,
then less responsibility suffices. Others favor a contextually invariant
41. See, e.g., Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 76–78; McMahan, Killing in War, 203–35.
42. I do not mean to exclude the possibility of omissive responsibility for a threat. I
think we should sometimes describe omissions as causes, while others might account for
them in other ways, but it is clear that failures to act can sometimes make one sufficiently
responsible for a threat to be liable to suffer harm to avert it.
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threshold. This difference does not matter here, since we can hold
the stakes constant. For now, we can rule out two implausible extremes.
Lazar Risky Killing 107Mere causal contribution, however slight, cannot ground liability; nor is
it plausible that only culpable, direct, necessary, and sufficient causes
can be liable.
With these conceptual points in place, I can state the argument’s
first premise:
ð1Þ If all an attacking combatant A knows about two potential enemy
victims N and C is that N is a noncombatant and C a combatant,
then it is more likely that N is innocent than that C is.
The reasoning behind premise ð1Þ is simple: that N is a noncom-
nt, C a combatant, tells A that C is more likely than N to be causallybata
involved in unjustified threats. It tells A little, however, about which is
more likely to be culpable for her involvement.
To forestall confusion, this premise is consistent with thinking that
many noncombatants are at least as causally responsible as many com-
batants for contributing to unjustified threats in war. Many combatants
contribute little if at all; many noncombatants contribute somewhat,
and some contribute a great deal. But despite this overlap, civilians in
general are less likely to be causally involved in unjustified threats in
war than are soldiers. Similarly, many women are taller than many men,
but still, men are likely to be taller than women.
Some civilians, such as political leaders, financiers, and influential
media figures, contribute significantly to unjustified threats and may
count among the exceptions written into Moral Distinction, unless cov-
ered by some other argument in its favor. But most civilians contribute
only throughmarginal and attenuated financial, political, andmoral sup-
port. Moreover, those who do not pay taxes, vote, or otherwise influence
public opinion do not contribute in even these ways. And of course chil-
dren barely contribute at all ðthough they are somewhat causally involved,
e.g., by motivating their parents to fightÞ.
Many soldiers contribute no more than most civilians to unjustified
threats.Butmanyothers contribute just like civilians—they vote, pay taxes,
and so on—and also actively participate in conflict. After all, somebody
does the killing. Many others contribute to the collective effort that
results in death and destruction. Indeed, if a member of the military
does not at least have a role that contributes to its ability to pose threats,
then what is the point of that role? If combatants were no more likely to
contribute to threats than noncombatants, we would not have a func-
tioning military.
However, soldiers’ greater likelihood of contributing to threats does
not justify premise ð1Þ on its own. If civilians were more likely to be cul-This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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pable than soldiers, that might outweigh their different causal contri-
butions. An agent’s culpability for an unjustified threat depends on at
108 Ethics October 2015least ðaÞ whether she intended the threat, ðbÞ whether she could foresee
that she would contribute to it, and that it would be unjustified, and
ðcÞ whether she had reasonable alternatives to acting that way. However,
if A’s knowledge that N is a noncombatant, C a combatant, gives her any
evidence pertaining to these facts, it suggests C is more likely to be cul-
pable than N. Consider each in turn:
ðaÞ C’s participation typically involves taking more steps to be part of
the war as a whole. This suggests that it is closer to her intentions than forN.
ðbÞ C could more easily foresee that her acts would lead to unjustified
threats than could N, since the typical combatant contributes more than
the typical noncombatant. Moreover, neither C nor N is more likely to
know if those threats are justified. Combatantsmight sometimes havemore
first-hand information, but noncombatants have more time to inform
themselves, and are less indoctrinated. If they are epistemic peers, and C
is more likely to contribute causally, then C is taking a bigger risk than is N,
which again means she is more likely to be acting culpably.
ðcÞ It is hard to say in general whether combatants andnoncombatants
have reasonable alternatives tomaking their particular contributions.Con-
scripts might not, but any country that strictly penalizes conscientious ob-
jectorsprobably alsopenalizes its citizens fornotdoing their part.Volunteer
combatants, of course, do have reasonable alternatives to fighting.
In summary: C ’s combatant status is evidence that he is more likely
to contribute to unjustified threats than N, and that he is perhaps more
likely than N to be culpable for those contributions. Premise ð1Þ follows:
N is more likely to be innocent than C.
One might object that, if both C and N are on the justified side in a
war, A might lack grounds to believe C sufficiently responsible for un-
justified threats, even if he is more dangerous in general. This would be
a mistake. Even if C ’s side is in fact fighting justly, there is always a
significant probability that any threats he contributes to are unjustified.
Even the best wars involve numerous unjustified threats ðincluding some
war crimesÞ, and in realistic cases, we are never certain that we are fight-
ing a just war. As long as this is true, it remains more likely that C con-
tributes to unjustified threats than that N does.
One might further object that premise ð1Þ applies only to actual
cases. We can imagine counterexamples: suppose the noncombatant
population includes only adults in a direct democracy who have unani-
mously voted to launch an unjustified war, knowing their decision’s ram-
ifications, with no penalties for noncompliance; suppose their armed
forces are noncitizen slaves who would be killed if they disobey orders.43
43. For a similar case, see McMahan, Killing in War, 217.This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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Then premise ð1Þ would be false. However, neither this premise, nor
Moral Distinction, is an exceptionless statement of necessary truths. It
Lazar Risky Killing 109suffices for my purposes if it is contingently true in the world as it is.
C. Combatants Should Find out Whether Their Victims
Are Noncombatants
Premise ð1Þ would be irrelevant to Moral Distinction if A could not find
out whether her potential victims are combatants or noncombatants. To
address this possibility, I need to argue for:
ð2Þ Either A’s evidence bears on whether her potential victims are
combatants or noncombatants, or she probably ought not to
use lethal force at all.
The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions requires
batants to bear arms openly, wear uniforms, and separate themselvescom
from the noncombatant population. It gives special legal privileges to those
who fight openly, including the permission to use force and the rights of
prisoners of war. In regular conflicts, when combatants fight according to
international law, telling them from noncombatants should be easy.
However, Moral Distinction applies also in irregular conflicts, in
which concealing soldiers among civilians can be necessary to military
success. Of course, A can still tell whether her target is actually fighting,
which is sufficient for combatant status. But it is a cliché about such con-
flicts that telling civilians and soldiers apart is very difficult.
For my argument to work, A need only believe that N is more likely
thanC to be a noncombatant ðthat is what I mean by A’s evidence bear-
ing on whether her victims are combatants or noncombatantsÞ. If she
does the morally required research, she will at least be able to reach this
conclusion. If not, she typically should not fight at all.44 The stakes could
not be higher, so she must bear heavy costs to discover whom she is kill-
ing. If she still cannot find out whether her victims are combatants or
noncombatants, then she lacks any evidence pertaining to liability, since
from any other relevant evidence she could infer her victim’s civilian/
military status.
Killing someone when you have no idea whether she is liable or not
is as seriously wrongful as killing someone whom you know to be inno-
cent. If you are ready to proceed without knowing whether your target is
liable, you display your indifference to her moral standing just as egre-
giously as if you knew for sure that she was innocent. For example, the
indiscriminate ‘harassment and interdiction’ artillery campaigns used by
the Russian army in the second Chechen War were as morally objection-
able as theUS attempt to bombNorth Vietnam “back to the Stone Age” in
44. See article 57 of the First Additional Protocol, on Precautions in Attack.This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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the 1960s. Selecting targets at random is as bad as intentionally aiming
at the innocent.45 If A cannot find out whether her victims are combat-
110 Ethics October 2015ants or noncombatants, she typically ought to withhold fire.
However, sometimes killing those you know to be innocent is per-
missible, either as an unintended side effect, or as an intended lesser
evil. As presently stated, Risky Killing does not apply when: A lacks any
evidence about N ’s and C ’s status; she has no beliefs on the matter;
and she would be justified in killing them even if she knew they were
innocent. I think these cases will be very rare, but they are nonethe-
less exceptions. However, a natural extension of Risky Killing would
cover them.
The necessity and endangerment arguments from Sections III.C
and III.D work with the victim’s probabilities, as well as the agent’s. If A
subjects N to an unnecessary risk of harm, on N’s evidence, then that
aggravatesA’s violation ofN ’s right to life; by exposingN to this unchosen
risk of wrongful harm, on N’s evidence, A further undermines her interest
in security. Now, even if A does not know whether N or C is a noncom-
batant, N and C do know. And from their perspective, N is also more
probably innocent than C is. Some of the arguments adduced in Sec-
tions IV.B and IV.D are equally relevant here. They will be both uncer-
tain whether they have contributed to threats, and doubtful whether
those threats are justified. With rare exceptions, N should be more con-
fident that she is innocent than should C.
Combatants should find out whether their potential victims are ci-
vilians or soldiers. They should bear considerable costs to gather that in-
formation. If they have borne all reasonable costs and still have no rele-
vant evidence, then they ought not to use lethal force unless the stakes
are very high. Killing people without regard to whether they are innocent
is as seriously wrongful as killing them knowing they are innocent. Cases
in which A is ignorant about N ’s and C ’s status, but killing is nonethe-
less permissible, are exceptions to the present argument for Moral Dis-
tinction from Risky Killing, and I set them aside in what follows. Still, a
modified version of Risky Killing could encompass them, since if both N
and C are innocent, killing N is worse than killing C because on their evi-
dence, N is more likely to be innocent than C.
D. Noncombatant Status Is the Best Evidence of Innocence
Premises ð1Þ and ð2Þ would not support Moral Distinction if A had fur-
ther evidence, which showed that C was at least as likely to be innocent as
N, contradicting premise ð1Þ. We need a further premise:
45. Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence
from Chechnya,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 ð2009Þ: 331–62.
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ð3Þ In all but rare exceptional cases, the rest of A’s evidence is
consistent with the probability distribution in premise ð1Þ.
Innoc
4
innoc
Lazar Risky Killing 111If merely being a taxpayer and voter in a democracy is sufficient for
lity, for example, then premise ð3Þ could be false, because A knowsliabi
that N is an adult citizen of a democracy. Of course, some adult citizens
do not pay taxes, or do not vote, or vote against the government that
fought the war. And even if N is probably liable, it is still more likely
that C is liable, since everything true of N is normally also true of C ðas
an adult, perhaps a voter, almost certainly a taxpayerÞ, but combatants
also contribute in other ways.
Nonetheless, endorsing this kind of low threshold of responsibility
for liability clearly weakens Moral Distinction. I think this is good reason
to reject the low threshold, which in general is far too permissive. In
lethal self-defense, it is very likely that someone will die or suffer some
other severe harm. Either Defender must kill Target or else bear the cost
herself. There is a strong presumption against killing Target to save her-
self, for two reasons. Target has moral status, which prohibits sacrificing
him for an equally good or marginally better outcome. And it is worse to
kill another person than to let oneself die. Defender may kill Target only
if there is a moral asymmetry between them that can overcome this pre-
sumption.46 Only a high degree of responsibility delivers this asymmetry;
only if the target is significantly responsible is there a proper fit between
what he has done and the severity of his fate.
A high threshold might look like the following: some degree of
causal contribution and some degree of agential involvement are nec-
essary but not sufficient for liability to be killed; additionally, at least one
of those elements must be relevantly substantial. A substantial causal con-
tributionmightmean being a necessary, sufficient, direct cause. Together
with minimal agential involvement, that might suffice for liability to be
killed. Substantial agential involvement might mean culpability, which
with a relatively slight causal contribution might also suffice for liability.
On a high-threshold conception of liability like this, premise ð3Þ will
be true. In both regular and irregular warfare, very few noncombatants
are sufficiently causally responsible for unjustified threats to be liable for
that reason alone, and we normally cannot know how culpable they are.
War is not the place to attribute guilt, which is difficult enough even in
court. Attacking combatants typically target coordinates, not individu-
als; even when individuals are in their sights, they are almost invariably
anonymous.47 And they need not forbear from fighting if they cannot
46. This point was best made in McMahan, “Self-Defense and the Problem of the
ent Attacker,” Ethics 104 ð1994Þ: 252–90.
7. Some think that this uncertainty, and inability to discriminate, means that the
ent soldiers killed in war are not killed intentionally, at least not in the way required
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determine their victims’ guilt—the risk of killing innocent people must
be traded against the importance of fighting justified wars. If we had to
112 Ethics October 2015find out our targets’ culpability before killing them, we would have to be
pacifists.
Premise ð3Þ holds true unless A discovers that N is causally respon-
sible enough to be liable even if she is not culpable—perhaps she is a
financier who has bankrolled the conflict, for example. Some other ar-
gument for Moral Distinction might still apply, but if not, this might be
an exception. These exceptions will be rare, because so few noncombat-
ants are causally responsible to the required degree.
What if the attacking combatant knows that his targets are politi-
cians? Or munitions workers? Or other suppliers to the military? In both
international law and our pretheoretical judgements, these are border-
line cases. In my view, international law protects politicians because of
their crucial role in establishing peace after conflict—not on principled
grounds. People who are part of the command structure of the military
are ðmorallyÞ combatants.
Munitions workers and other suppliers are a harder case.48 On the
high threshold view, they do not causally contribute enough to unjus-
tified threats to be liable unless they are also substantially culpable.
Since we cannot know whether they are culpable, they are rightly con-
sidered noncombatants, and finding out that N is a munitions worker
should not make her less likely to be innocent than C. To see this,
consider a simple case. Albert runs the only gun store in town and sells
Ben a weapon. Ben uses that gun to threaten Carrie’s life. She can save
herself only by killing Albert. I think doing so would be wrong, unless
Albert was culpable for supplying Ben that weapon—either because
selling guns in general is wrong or because selling to Ben was wrong.
Munitions workers and other suppliers contribute less to unjustified
threats than does Albert. And mere participation in weapons manufac-
ture is not obviously wrong; otherwise how could we fight just wars?
Since the circumstances of war make attributing culpability so difficult,
we should think of munitions workers as noncombatants.
One might object like this: suppose N is a munitions worker; what
if her side is clearly in the wrong, so that she must know that she will
contribute only to unjustified threats? Wouldn’t she be culpable enough
then? In response: first, these general grounds for thinking N culpable
will apply also to C, so the additional evidence will wash out, and N will
still be more likely to be innocent than C. Second, even conflicts that
for killing them to breach a constraint ðMcMahan, “Who Is Morally Liable to Be Killed in48. Fabre, “Guns, Food, and Liability to Attack in War,” Ethics 120 ð2009Þ: 36–63.
War?” Analysis 71 ½2011: 544–59; Adil Ahmad Haque, “Killing in the Fog of War,” Southern
California Law Review 86 ½2012: 63–116Þ. I do not take a position on that debate here.
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seem clear-cut with hindsight were, at the time, deeply contested, with
radical evidential defects. Hypothetical cases can be misleading. The re-
Lazar Risky Killing 113ality of warfare is always much messier than any case we can describe in a
philosophy article, and there are always reasonable people with diamet-
rically opposed interpretations of the facts.
One might further object that premise ð3Þ is false in irregular con-
flicts: suppose A finds out that N has hidden enemy combatants in her
house, for example. Should A then reject premise ð1Þ? I think not. Evi-
dence like this might narrow the gap between N and C, but still, N is
more likely than C to be innocent. Although civilians contribute more
to threats in irregular than in regular wars, so do combatants.49 Over the
last several decades, conventional militaries have been ‘civilianized’, so
that many members of the armed forces have only an attenuated con-
nection to combat.50 Guerrilla forces do not enjoy the same specialist
division of labour. The average guerrilla causally contributes more than
the average combatant in regular armed forces. So, even if N is more
likely to be liable in irregular conflicts, so is C, and premise ð3Þ remains
true.
Indeed, this point about civilianization of the military can be taken
still further. If conventional militaries have clearly distinguished groups
that contribute only insignificantly and marginally to unjustified threats,
and are not distributed among the rest of the corps, so that on a high
threshold they are surely innocent, then the argument from Risky Kill-
ing would suggest that killing them is no better than killing civilians.
Perhaps one of the other arguments for Moral Distinction might step
in, or perhaps we should consider them legitimate exceptions, like pris-
oners of war, or wounded combatants rendered hors de combat.
E. From Risky Killing to Moral Distinction
The next premise applies Risky Killing of Section III to the present case.
ð4Þ ½From Risky Killing If both N and C are innocent, then killing
N is worse than killing C if either ðiÞ A believes Nmore likely to4
tieth C
5
115–7be innocent than C or ðiiÞ A believes N no more likely to be in-
nocent than C because of A’s own negligence.
A’s negligence is either her failure to gather and respond adequately
e evidence or her decision to proceed, despite the evidence notto th
supporting any conclusion as to her victims’ status. Negligent killing is9. On this point, see Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twen-
entury, 196–233.
0. Gabriella Blum, “TheDispensable Lives of Soldiers,” Journal of Legal Analysis 2 ð2010Þ:
0.
This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
worse when the negligence is more causally significant to the outcome.
N has stronger grounds for complaint than C, because A’s doing the
114 Ethics October 2015proper research would have given her more reason not to kill N but no
less reason to kill C. Had she found out that N was a noncombatant, she
would have had more reason to spare her; but finding out that C was
a combatant would have the opposite result. C cannot complain, then,
about A’s lack of research, whereas N has definitely been made worse off
by it.
We can nowmake the implications of premises ð1Þ, ð2Þ, and ð3Þ clear.
Following premise ð1Þ, if A believes that N is a noncombatant and C a
combatant, then N is more likely to be innocent than is C. Following
premise ð2Þ, on A’s evidence either N is a noncombatant and C a com-
batant, or else A typically ought to refrain from using lethal force. Fol-
lowing premise ð3Þ, A has no further evidence pertaining to N ’s and C ’s
liability that is more informative than their noncombatant and combat-
ant status. So the probability assignment made in premise ð1Þ stands
up: on A’s evidence, N is more likely to be innocent than C. Taking these
three together, if A kills N and C, there are four possible scenarios:
ðaÞ A’s evidence shows that the probability that N is innocent is greater
than that C is, and A’s beliefs align with the evidence: she believes N
more likely to be innocent than C ; ðbÞ A’s evidence shows that N is more
likely to be innocent than C, but A believes C at least as likely to be
innocent as N because she failed to do the proper research, or to reason
adequately; ðcÞ A’s evidence is inconclusive about N ’s and C ’s combat-
ant or noncombatant status, and A ought not to use lethal force at all;
ðdÞ A’s evidence is inconclusive, but using lethal force would be permis-
sible even if both N and C were noncombatants.
In scenario ðaÞ, killing N is worse than killing C according to the
first disjunct of Risky Killing ðpremise 4ðiÞÞ. In scenarios ðbÞ and ðcÞ, A
kills N and C negligently, by proceeding without doing adequate re-
search, or proceeding when she should have held fire until doing more
research became possible. Killing N is worse than killing C under the
second disjunct of Risky Killing ðpremise 4ðiiÞÞ. Scenario ðdÞ is an ex-
ception to this argument but is picked up by the amendment suggested
at the end of Section IV.C above. We can bring these points together
into the following premise, and the main conclusion of the argument
from Risky Killing:
ð5Þ ½From premises ð1Þ, ð2Þ, and ð3Þ Either A believes N more
likely to be innocent than C, or if she doesn’t, then with rare
exceptions that is because of A’s negligence.
ð6Þ ½From premises ð4Þ and ð5Þ If N and C are in fact innocent,
then with rare exceptions, killing N is worse than killing C.
In other words, killing innocent noncombatants is worse than kill-
nnocent combatants. Before proceeding from this preliminary con-ing iThis content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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clusion to the justification ofMoral Distinction, onemight revive here the
‘moral beliefs’ objection to Risky Killing. Suppose A believes there is no
Lazar Risky Killing 115such thing as rights or liability. Or that international law exhausts the
moral rules applicable to war. Or she affirms a low threshold of liability
to be killed. Each of these moral beliefs would affect the probability that
she will kill a nonliable person. She might then reject premise ð1Þ non-
negligently, so premise ð5Þ might be false.
Suppose that you were unpersuaded by my earlier response to this
worry. Two more should help: first, given that the legal corollaries of
Moral Distinction are so widely endorsed, I doubt whether anyone be-
lieves that enemy noncombatants are as likely to be liable as enemy com-
batants. Second, if A assigns no probability to high-threshold views of
liability at all, then she is negligently overconfident in her moral beliefs.
But if she assigns any probability to a high threshold, then premise ð5Þ
is true, since it is true on the high-threshold view and not contradicted
by the alternatives. If liability is chimerical, then obviously N and C are
equally unlikely to be liable. On a low threshold, perhaps N and C are
equally likely to be liable, but more plausibly C is still more likely to be
liable than N. Since C is more likely to be liable than N on the high-
threshold view, however A splits her credence between these possibili-
ties ðno liability, high threshold, low thresholdÞ, the net result is that C is
more likely to be liable than N.
We can now defend Moral Distinction. It will help to recall the
premises so far:
ð1Þ If all that an attacking combatant A knows about two potential
enemy victims N and C is that N is a noncombatant and C a
combatant, then it is more likely that N is innocent than that
C is.
ð2Þ Either A’s evidence bears on whether her potential victims are
combatants or noncombatants, or she probably ought not to
use lethal force at all.
ð3Þ In all but rare exceptional cases, the rest of A’s evidence is
consistent with the probability distribution in premise ð1Þ.
ð4Þ ½From Risky Killing If both N and C are innocent, then killing
N is worse than killing C if either ðiÞ A believes N more likely
to be innocent than C or ðiiÞ A believes N no more likely to
be innocent than C because of A’s own negligence.
ð5Þ ½From premises ð1Þ, ð2Þ, and ð3ÞEither A believesNmore likely
to be innocent than C, or if she doesn’t, then with rare excep-
tions that is because of A’s negligence.
ð6Þ ½From premises ð4Þ and ð5Þ If N and C are in fact innocent,
then with rare exceptions, killing N is worse than killing C.
This does not get us all the way to Moral Distinction, since it ap-
only when both N and C are innocent. The remaining steps requirepliesThis content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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us to lean again on a high threshold of responsibility for liability, on
which very few noncombatants are liable to be killed:
116 Ethics October 2015ð7Þ With rare exceptions, noncombatants in war are innocent; so
are many combatants.By endorsing this high-threshold view, we can account not only for
comparative wrongfulness of killing civilians, relative to killing sol-the
diers but also for its absolute, or noncomparative moral gravity. Killing
civilians is so bad because they are almost invariably not liable to be
killed. Of course, this means that some soldiers are also innocent. Risky
Killing explains why killing innocent civilians is worse than killing inno-
cent soldiers. But killing civilians is so seriously wrongful because they are
innocent.
We can now argue for Moral Distinction disjunctively: killing non-
combatants is worse than killing combatants either because the non-
combatants are innocent and the combatants are not or, when both are
innocent, because killing innocent noncombatants is worse than kill-
ing innocent combatants. This completes the argument for Moral Dis-
tinction:
ð8Þ ½From premise ð6Þ With rare exceptions, killing innocent
noncombatants is worse than killing innocent combatants.ð9Þ Killing innocent noncombatants is worse than killing liable
combatants ðthis is analytic: killing those who are liable to be
killed is not wrongfulÞ.
ð10Þ ½From premises ð7Þ, ð8Þ, and ð9ÞWith rare exceptions, killing
noncombatants is worse than killing combatants ði.e., Moral
DistinctionÞ.
This argument justifies Moral Distinction on both the unjust and just
in war. It is also consistent with some combatants and noncombat-sides
ants being responsible to the same degree for contributing to unjustified
threats ðas per premise ð7ÞÞ. It rests on empirical claims that both Walzer
and his revisionist critics should endorse, but it supports Moral Distinc-
tion when their views are silent. It does not cover every case in which
Moral Distinction should apply, but it takes us closer to that goal.
V. CONCLUSION
Contemporary just war theory has made profound advances, setting the
ethics of war on solid foundations. But there have been casualties along
the way—no doubt unintended. Foremost among them is the moral dis-
tinction between killing soldiers and killing civilians. In this article, I have
defended Moral Distinction, using normative and empirical premises
that contemporary just war theorists can endorse. This is but one strandThis content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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in a pluralist defense of that principle. And Moral Distinction itself is
only a first step toward the legal principles of noncombatant immunity,
Lazar Risky Killing 117proportionality, and precautions in attack, on which the safety of civil-
ians in war depends. But the case for those principles relies on Moral
Distinction. Any successful argument in its favor bolsters the protection
of civilians in war, when that protection is both most necessary and most
at risk.This content downloaded from 150.203.226.80 on Wed, 30 Sep 2015 01:52:17 AM
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